






Challenges for Japanese Universities’ Technology Licensing Offices – 










Vice President, Fairfield Resources, International 
Stamford, CT, USA 
and 
Adjunct Professor 
Columbia University Business School 


















                                                 




American universities have been transferring their technology to industry since before 
World War II. This technology is now developed with the more than $35 Billion the 
universities receive annually from the Federal government and industry, with the latter 
providing less than 10% of the total. The universities annually receive in total more than 
$1 Billion in royalty payments, create hundreds of new start-up companies every year, 
and are the recipients of more than 3400 US patents. Most of the royalties are paid for 
biomedical and pharmaceutical [“bio” and “pharma”] research, with these funding 
companies usually insisting on and obtaining exclusive intellectual property [IP] rights. 
As a pure business model, this process is somewhat questionable for the universities, but 
the other benefits obtained by the universities and society more than compensate for the 
costs. This paper will address US technology transfer from the viewpoint of an industrial 
“customer” – IBM - and from the viewpoint of my consulting company that represents 
universities and companies in technology transfer. From this experience we will identify 
some challenges facing newly “privatized” Japanese universities and propose some 
suggestions to Japanese Technology Licensing Offices [TLO] for what we believe are 
“best practices” in technology transfer. 
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Introduction  
 
“Technology Transfer” is a simple term which covers a multitude of processes. In its 
most basic sense, however, it covers the transfer – intentional or otherwise, for a fee or 
for free – of patents, trade secrets or other know-how from the owner to another party. 
Both the sender and the recipient can be an individual, a company or one of its divisions, 
a government entity, a university, or another owner of technology.  In this paper I will 
focus on transfers from United States universities to private companies. However, 
because it is less commonly discussed but nevertheless embodies many of the key 
features of the former, I will also briefly discuss the challenges of technology transfer 
within a large company. 
 
In this context, “technology” is commonly understood to mean patents, although patent 
applications and know-how – in essence, any relevant information not in the public 
domain – can also be valuable and the object of transfers. (Ordinarily, patent rights are 
irrelevant in internal company transfers.) There is an enormous body of literature 
describing patents and patenting2  and for the purposes of this paper I will assume the 
reader has at least a passing familiarity with this field. Most important for my present 
purpose, a patent is an exclusionary monopoly. That is, the only right an issued patent 
confers on the patentee is the right to prevent another party from practicing the invention, 
primarily as defined in the patent claims, in the national jurisdiction (country) in which 
the patent is in force. In other words, if no one other than the patentee has an interest in 
practicing his invention, the patent’s value is de minimus. 
                                                 
2 For a readable introduction, see Essentials of Intellectual Property, by Alexander I. Poltorok and Paul J. 
Lerner, John Wiley and Sons, New York (2002) 
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American universities have been transferring their technology to industry for nearly a 
century. The situation in Japan is quite different. Unlike US institutions, Japanese 
universities have not been major centers of basic research and their research budgets have 
been an order of magnitude or so less than in the US3. Since April, 2004, however, with 
the putting into effect of the so-called Privatization Law, Japanese schools have received 
a major stimulus to change. That is because under the new law any money received from 
technology transfer can now be spent at the discretion of university management rather 
than as budgeted by the former Education Ministry [Now part of MEXT, the Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology]. In anticipation of this event, 
schools throughout the country have established TLO’s, Technology Licensing Offices, 
whose mission is to manage the transfer process and earn fees. As of this writing, 
according to the Japan Association for University Intellectual Property Management, 
JAUIPTM, there are approximately 40 TLO’s4. My objective here is to describe the 
salient features of US university technology transfer and from them to extract some 
messages which can be profitably employed by the newly “privatized” Japanese 
universities. 
 
US University Environment 
 
The basic source for information covering US university technology transfer is found in 
the annual surveys of AUTM, the Association of University Technology Managers5. In 
brief, a large majority of US institutions have a licensing office. Their main function is 
                                                 
3 Getting a clear figure for Japanese government research expense is not easy, since most university 
research is carried out in national universities, and they do not break out “research” expenses from other 
recurring expenses such as faculty salaries 
4 http://www.jauiptm.jp/en/member/member.html] 
5 See http://www.autm.net/memberConnect/survey_summary.cfm#2003Summary for the 2003 summary 
report 
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normally to negotiate research contracts with foundations, industrial companies and the 
government. Depending on the quality of the results of this research, however, the offices 
also negotiate licensing deals. According to AUTM, approximately 70% of all licensing 
income (from a total of approximately $1B in 2003) is received by the top ten schools, 
leaving perhaps $300M to be spread – thinly - around hundreds of research institutions. 
 
Responding to concerns that the US was losing its technological leadership, Congress in 
1980 passed the Bayh-Dole Law, which mandates that university and government 
researchers share in any licensing payments received by their institutions, typically about 
one-third 6 . Although intended to motivate researchers to engage in commercially 
important work, its results are, in my opinion7 mixed. Its basic limitation is that it is a 
trailing incentive, and a slow one at that. There is no direct positive feedback to 
researchers anywhere in the process as envisioned by Bayh-Dole until there has been a 
successful, paid transfer. This is ordinarily years after the initial work, even for industrial 
researchers. The delay is much longer in universities, where the emphasis is on more 
basic work. Ultimately a few successful transfers, almost all in the medical or pharma 
fields8, have greatly enriched a handful of inventors.  
 
                                                 
6 See Morrison and Foerster LLP, http://www.mofo.com/news/news/files/article827.html for much more 
than you need to know about the Act. 
7 and of others, as well. See, for example, David C. Mowery, at 
http://www.biopharm.org.tw/srb/07232002/Dr._Mowery.pdf], 
8 See Mowery, op. cit 
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Association of University Technology Managers (USA) 2003 Survey Data 
Licensing FTEs in Technology Transfer Office 654.15
Other FTEs in Technology Transfer Office 664.93
Research Expenditures: Industrial Sources $2,537,020,737
Research Expenditures: Federal Govt. Sources $23,062,609,472
Total Sponsored Research Expenditures $34,826,920,266
Licenses/Options Executed 3,846
Start-up Companies Formed 348
Gross License Income Received $1,029,158,110
License Income Paid to Other Institutions $65,489,154
Legal Fees Expended $176,278,483
Legal Fees Reimbursed $74,971,227
Licenses/Options Yielding License Income 8,976
Invention Disclosures Received 13,718
Total U.S. Patent Applications Filed 11,755
New U.S. Patent Applications Filed 7,203
U.S. Patents Issued 3,450
Japan, in parallel with the privatization law, has also enacted its own version of the Bayh-
Dole Law. I leave it to motivational psychologists to show that this is a strong motivator 
to others. It is far too early to judge the impact of the Japanese law. Recent Japanese 
court rulings favorable to inventors in several cases where the inventors have sued their 
employers for a share in royalties9 indicate a shift in the Japanese environment, but in 
general the payments for licenses and patent infringement in Japan are barely a tenth of 
those in the US, so it is difficult to see much of a stimulus to Japanese inventors from a 
fraction of a small royalty. 
 
However, American university researchers have another path to wealth. Sometimes called 
spin-offs, this refers to companies started by entrepreneurial researchers based on their 
                                                 
9 The case of Dr. Shuji Nakamura and his invention of the blue light emitting diode is most noteworthy, see 
for example Inventor Compensation: An Early Spring for Japanese Industry, John A. Tessensohn and 
Shusaku Yamamoto, World Intellectual Property Organization Report, Volume 19 Number 03,  
March 2005 at 
http://subscript.bna.com/SAMPLES/wipr.nsf/0/a1d549054c42eb5a85256fb800692099?OpenDocument  
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research. In 2003, according to AUTM, there were almost 350 of these established. 
Naturally, many of these fail but the payoff for success, in the form of a buyout or an IPO, 
(Initial Public offering) can be very large and is much more common than a “home run” 
patent license. In contrast, the Japanese environment for entrepreneurial start-ups is much 
less favorable. 
  
US universities also receive many patents, over 3000 in 2003. A few major research 
schools like Stanford and MIT each received well over a hundred, while the California 
University System received over 300. In contrast, all Japanese universities together 
received fewer than 100 US patents in 2003, although their Japanese patents were much 
higher. Later I will explain why the US patents are much more important. 
 




























Cal System 2623 1027 490 208 61 323 22 
Johns 
Hopkins 
1461 330 380 159 6.6 95 5 
MIT 994 452 235 114 24.2 152 15 
Illinois 785 229 118 86 7.6 39 6 
Washington 784 199 73 67 29.1 46 3 
Michigan 749 257 97 76 7.4 64 9 
Wisconsin 721 406 146 177 37.6 87 0 
Penn. 650 321 152 83 10.2 50 12 
Stanford 640 362 290 128 43.1 117 12 
SUNY 629 235 132 34 13.7 51 4 
Source: AUTM 2003 Survey 
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Japanese Universities’ United States Patents (2004) 
 
Japanese University US Patents (2004) US Patents (approx total) 
Hokkaido 5 20 
Toyama 3 ~ 
Hiroshima 4 23 
Nagoya 7 16 
Tohoku 2 43 
Kyoto 2 21 
Tokyo 8 44 
Nihon 3 ~ 
Kyushu 2 18 
Osaka 3 36 
Tokai 4 ~ 
Niigata 2 ~ 
Kanazawa 2 14 
Kobe 3 5 
Total, all universities 61  
Source: www.uspto.gov 
 
Perhaps the most striking number in the AUTM data is the money spent on sponsored 
research in US universities: almost $35 Billion. The $1 Billion in gross royalties (before 
legal and staff expense) is a “return on investment” of less than 3%. If this were the only 
objective of university research, it would be a poor business indeed. On the other hand, 
for a university researcher or administrator, the more attractive target is clearly the 
research support money. As I will discuss later, fortunately, universities for the most part 
have a more important goal than realizing licensing income. Comparable data for 




European universities have much in common with Japanese institutions. Most are public, 
with faculty and researcher government employees and budgets substantially established 
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by bureaucrats. With rare exceptions (such as the Swiss ETH, Swiss Federal Technical 
Institute, and a few well-known British universities), they are not known for their 
research results. For example, most French research is carried out in CNRS (National 
Center for Scientific Research), CEA (Atomic Energy Commission) and other 
government laboratories, rather than in universities. The Fraunhofer Institute in Germany 
is well known for its productive research but it is not a university. German universities 
are not noted for their contributions to research. Not surprisingly, the total amount of 
royalty payments to all European universities is perhaps of the order of $50M – not much 
more than that received in 2003 by Stanford alone10. 
 
Some European countries do allow researchers to own the intellectual property resulting 
from their work, e.g. Finland, unlike Germany and France where the university is the 
owner, but there are limited incentives such as Bayh-Dole available and, in any case, 
relatively few schools have organized technology transfer functions, and socialist 
traditions and labor laws have not made for a favorable entrepreneurial environment. 
Recognizing the challenge, the Europeans have started to change their legal environment 
in the late 1990’s so that there is a greater incentive for university researchers to engage 
in work that contributes to society. It is still too early to say how well this is working  
 
One last characteristic of the European environment relates to the various patent systems. 
The most significant distinction is the absolute bar against being granted a patent after 
there has been a divulgation of the invention. Inventors in the US have a one year grace 
                                                 
10 Universities’ IP Assets: Are They Transferable to the Private Sector? Pierre-Laurent Joly, Masters 
Paper, submitted to NDS IP October 2004, Zurich, Switzerland, unpublished. 
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period. European university faculty, whose recognition substantially depends on prompt 
publication of their research results, are thus discouraged from submitting invention 
disclosures in the first place, since normal review procedures will inevitably delay 
publication. Even the one year available in the US discourages inventors – even those in 
industry – from being completely diligent in disclosing all their inventive ideas to the 
administration. Another topic of active debate is the difficulty in obtaining a European 
patent on a software invention or a business method. There is little doubt that there have 
been many questionable US patents issued for software and business methods but it is 
also true that these are areas where US researchers have been very active because of their 
great commercial interest. 
 
It is important to remember that in much of Europe and Asia where the majority of 
universities are state institutions there are sound arguments against their administrations 
charging a fee for access to their intellectual property, since it is ordinarily developed 
with public money. Similar arguments can be made in the US for NIH-funded research, 
as well as for research performed in public universities. This, however, is a matter for 
another study. 
 
Importance of US Patents 
 
There are a number of reasons why a US patent can be much more valuable than a patent 
in another country. Indeed, in many fields it is often sufficient to have only the US patent, 
and eschew foreign counterparts entirely. Most important, the US is of course the largest 
economy and thus the largest market for products and services in the world. Thus, the 
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odds are that a product utilizing a patented invention will have much higher sales in the 
US than it would elsewhere – often more than everywhere. As a result, failure to secure 
the exclusionary monopoly in the US leaves the greater part of revenues and profits 
available to anyone. 
 
Complementary to this, the US is the country with a legal environment most favorable to 
patent owners. The “patent court”, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), 
has made considerable progress in ensuring predictability and consistency when a patent 
matter is litigated. Partly as a result, the majority of litigated patents are now found to be 
valid. As of April 1, 2005, Japan has opened its own counterpart to the CAFC. At the 
other end of the process, in spite of many legitimate criticisms, the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) examination process is widely accepted to be thorough 
and dependable, although much improvement is needed in such areas as discovering prior 
art for software and business method patents. Moreover, US patent owners who believe 
that their patent is being infringed abroad have access to the International Trade 
Commission (ITC). This body has no jurisdiction outside the US but it does have the 
power to stop importation of infringing goods, and it can do so in much less time than 
would be needed to get an injunction in Federal Courts for infringement based on similar 
evidence. Here, too, Japan has established its own version of the US institution. 
 
Finally, the US is “where the money is”. Not only are judgments and settlements in the 
case of infringement assertions much higher than in the rest of the world (hundreds of 
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millions of dollars are not extraordinary11), but even license payments between willing 
parties are much higher.  
In order to obtain a US counterpart patent for an application filed in another country, the 
cost is reasonable. Since the application or patent has been prepared by competent 
counsel in the original country, all that is needed is an English translation and a review by 
a US attorney to be sure the application conforms to US requirements. The filing fee (and 
subsequent maintenance fees, if desired) are nominal by international standards. Failure 
to file for a US patent is almost always an indication of a lack of faith in the commercial 
viability of the invention. Many multinationals, in fact, make their initial filing in the US 
before they decide in what other countries protection is warranted. The only exception 
would be a patent for an invention that would almost never be manufactured, purchased, 
or used in the US.12  
In summary, the US is the “major league” for intellectual property protection.  
 
The University’s Mission  
 
Economists well understand that the missions of a private business are to survive and 
grow profitably. Public and not-for-profit institutions have different goals. One could 
argue that they are therefore not “businesses” at all. Universities, in particular, have a 
unique pair of complementary goals. Their primary goal is to provide their students with 
the best education they can. Those universities which carry out research (whether or not it 
                                                 
11 Microsoft has appealed a $520M judgment for infringing patents owned by Eolas Technologies and the 
University of California, see http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/6511953.htm  
12 See R. A. Myers, Foreign Filing: Beyond the US Patent (Part 1 and 2), Patent Strategy and Management, 
March, 2003, page 5 and February, 2003, page 1 
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is scientific) have the further goal of contributing to society, of performing socially 
productive research. Neither of these goals has an explicit financial component. It is only 
to the extent that money earned from transferring technology helps support the primary 
goals that technology transfer has a financial element. The only exception I accept to this 
assertion is for those universities that are, in fact, for-profit businesses. However, since 
research is almost always a bad standalone business13, such institutions are most unlikely 
to do any, much less to have any royalties to play with. 
 
Thus, the goals of a university and the goals of business are almost always quite different. 
It can in fact be quite dangerous for either party to misjudge its purposes. For example, a 
company that invests major resources in contributing to society is seldom an investment 
favorite if it survives at all (pace Ben and Jerry who, after all, sell ice cream for profit). 
Such a company very quickly finds out it has erred. Universities, however, are often free 
to carry on a research-oriented business in parallel with their education and research 
missions. They may establish research programs with the distinct goal of 
commercializing the research. These are sometimes married to business incubators. They 
may well operate their TLO (or Technology Transfer Office) on a business-like basis. 
This is acceptable, until the university faculty neglects its students for the royalty mirage. 
 
A university can be great if it never makes a dollar from transferring its technology. 
Indeed, some great universities intentionally disown an interest in the faculty-developed 
                                                 
13 R. A. Myers, Patents and Patent Licensing in Independent Research Laboratories. Workshop at 
Licensing Executives Society Meeting, Salt Lake City, UT, February 15, 2003 
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intellectual property. Princeton offers a good example14.  In contrast, regardless of how 
much revenue its technology transfer generates, a university will never be recognized as 
“great” for its research unless there are recognized contributions to the scientific literature 
and the improvement of life. And none of this counts unless the students receive a great 
education. 
 
University-Generated Patents  
 
Even a cursory review of university patent portfolios simply confirms the generalization 
that most patents, perhaps more than 95%, are worthless, neither used nor licensed. 
Among the small fraction of valuable university patents, nearly all those with significant 
royalty payments are biomedical or pharmaceutical related patents. Of the universities 
earning notable royalty payments, nearly all have medical schools, and it is the patents 
generated in those schools which are profitably licensed. Even MIT, which earns 
relatively high royalties without a medical school, has a major research program in 
biotech-related fields. 
 
In this paper, I have not considered non-technical licensing activities, such as the 
university’s brand or mascot. One of the single most profitable technology transfers has 
been Florida University’s “Gatorade” brand, arguably a non-technical innovation. 
 
University technology transfer professionals also recognize that even the most successful 
university licensing programs are at best marginally profitable after accounting for staff 
                                                 
14 See http://www.princeton.edu/patents/intelprop.htm for the Princeton policy. Item 1 is “To maintain the 
University's policy of encouraging research and scholarship without regard to potential gain from royalties 
or other such income.” 
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and legal expenses. In fact, schools like MIT tend to view their patenting and licensing 
programs as a perquisite for the faculty and their industrial research sponsors rather than 
as a profit-generating activity. Schools which have a single-minded focus on licensing 
revenue are fated to be disappointed. As a result of Bayh-Dole, faculty inventors 
routinely receive a significant share of royalties, but those who do are a very small 
minority. 
 
This new world of patents and licensing has led to a serious change in the attitude of 
university administration. Traditionally, university faculty have routinely owned the 
intellectual property they created. Most of this, of course, was limited to textbooks, 
lectures, and course material. Every so often, however, they were owners of important 
patents. In particular, the early patents in the field of quantum electronics, such as those 
of Charles Townes of Columbia, Nicolaas Bloembergen of Harvard, and Gordon Gould, 
also of Columbia, as I will explain below, were assumed to be the property of the 
inventors, all of whom realized financial rewards. Gould in particular, then a graduate 
student, earned many millions of dollars from his patents. 
 
Since the 1980’s, however, university administrators thought they could see a big payoff 
available from exploiting faculty patents. As a result, their TLO’s were expanded and 
strengthened, and their licensing practices, formerly rather casual, were infused with the 
experience of new legal teams, and it became increasingly difficult for companies to 
establish good licensing relations with the most aggressive universities. Even contracts 
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for sponsored research were loaded with clauses relating to the ownership and disposition 
of any intellectual property developed during the project.  
 
The major exception here, too, relates to the medical schools and their research. Many 
biotech and drug companies have found it advantageous to simply outsource some of 
their research to universities. Their conditions are often strict, in that the sponsor simply 
owns the IP, and faculty publication is more or less at the discretion of the sponsor. Many 
schools find this state of affairs quite acceptable, since the sponsor supports numerous 
graduate students while the overhead charges on the grants are increasingly necessary to 
maintain the research infrastructure. 
 
Early Examples of University Technology Transfer and Its Hazards 
 
Since 1994 IBM has been by a wide margin the premier recipient of US patents. For 
decades prior to this the company has been widely acknowledged as a major innovator in 
business and technology. The history is very well documented15 but a few points bear 
repeating here. Thomas J. Watson, Sr. was the man who virtually single-handedly led an 
amalgam of struggling tabulating businesses, the “Computing-Tabulating-Recording 
Company” from the 1920’s through the 1950’s to its success as IBM. A strong-willed 
man, he was a very strong believer in the importance of patents as a tool for competitive 
advantage. The company boasted several of America’s most prolific inventors, and all 
were given broad responsibilities and treated well by Watson. 
 
                                                 
15 See, for example, Emerson W. Pugh, Building IBM: Shaping a Technology and an Industry, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, (1995), 
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In addition, Watson was also a believer in universities as a font of knowledge and talent. 
As long ago as 1937 the company founded the Watson Astronomical Laboratory at 
Columbia University in New York. In 1938 IBM began to fund Harvard Professor 
Howard Aiken with whom IBM developed the IBM ASCC, also known as the Mark I. 
One of the landmarks in commercial data processing, the machine was built in the 
Endicott, NY IBM plant and completed in 1943. Aiken’s key contribution was in the use 
of paper tape as a program store. All of the many patents filed on the machine were IBM 
property – an early indication of one extreme of university-industry contractual terms (if, 
indeed, there was ever any thought given to the matter then). According to one respected 
historian of science, “Watson’s support of academic research helped [IBM] establish 
itself in the field.”16 Thus, even sixty years ago Harvard was entitled to claim a major 
success in technology transfer. 
 
Unfortunately, Harvard, at least in Watson’s opinion, improperly claimed full credit for 
the Mark I at the 1944 unveiling. Watson was furious, as were the IBM engineering team 
members. As a result, Watson virtually forbade IBM from any collaboration with 
Harvard for many years (although the prohibition did not extend to hiring its graduates). 
Disappointed with its Harvard collaboration, IBM decided to start its own basic computer 
laboratory in 1947, the Watson Laboratory – at Columbia University, not Harvard. This 
incident illustrates another key lesson for university technology transfer managers. 
Industrial partners, as a rule, have many options. They can choose their partners based on 
qualification or prejudice; or they can choose to go it alone. The university’s bargaining 
power in transfer negotiations is almost always weaker. 
                                                 
16 Pugh, op. cit. 
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The history of early maser and laser patents, also dating from the 1950’s, provides more 
examples of successful technology transfer, although it was rarely so represented at the 
time. Charles Townes, then a Columbia professor, is universally [with the exception of a 
few Soviet apologists] recognized as the inventor of the maser, which was covered in a 
patent issued in 1959 after extensive revisions and a resubmission, US patent 
#2,879,43917. Columbia at the time had no mechanism for extracting a share in this 
patent; all indications are that it could not have cared less. Townes, on the other hand, 
had worked at Bell Laboratories and was quite familiar with patents and their 
advantages 18 .  The 1959 patent was his personal patent, from which he earned a 
respectable (for the time) stream of royalties. 
 
Columbia’s maser research kicked off decades of active research in quantum electronics. 
The next major innovation was made by Harvard professor Nicolaas Bloembergen. In 
that period, as documented in an earlier paper19, technology transfer was a wide, two-way 
street, and Bell Labs researchers and university faculty often met and exchanged ideas, 
with no contracts or agreements. In Bloembergen’s case, he came up with the concept of 
the continuous-wave three level maser, which he, too, patented (with encouragement 
from others more familiar with the patent system). This invention was the basis for all 
successive practical masers and lasers. Like Columbia, Harvard had neither a mechanism 
for nor an interest in patents, and the patent was Bloembergen’s personal property, US 
patent #2,909,654. Interestingly, the patent application was actually drafted by a Bell 
                                                 
17 For an extended discussion of this topic, see Who Invented the Laser - An Analysis of the Early Patents. 
R. A. Myers and Richard W. Dixon, Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences, vol. 34, part 1, p.115, 2003. 
18 C. H. Townes, How the Laser Happened, Oxford University. Press, New York, (1999) 
19Myers and Dixon, op. cit.   
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Labs attorney, in return for which AT&T received a royalty-free license. Bloembergen 
himself eventually received enough royalties to pay for his children’s college education. 
 
One cannot fail to be impressed by the fact that neither Harvard nor Columbia seems to 
have suffered in the slightest from their failure to exploit the creativity of their faculty. In 
this case, of course, both inventors went on to be awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics. 
 
US University Faculty and Research Staff 
 
University researchers are only superficially “employees”, particularly when it comes to 
their professional roles. In the case of faculty, this has been primarily a direct result of the 
western tradition of “tenure”, wherein a professor, after a period of apprenticeship, is 
awarded what is virtually a lifetime appointment. This has naturally promoted a highly 
independent attitude. This independence is further strengthened in the research sphere as 
researchers argue that “management” is not competent to judge their output. Rather, it is 
the mechanism of peer review that is said to determine success or failure. 
 
For whatever reasons, most university administrations have until recently followed a 
hands-off strategy with respect to intellectual property. Whether it is lecture notes, 
textbooks, or lecture honoraria, any payments have accrued to the professor or, almost as 
often, the research staffer.20. Needless to say, that has been satisfactory for the faculty and, 
considering the relatively small amount of money and traditionally low faculty salaries 
                                                 
20This is not the place to discuss the many failures of what is for the most part the successful path that 
universities have followed 
   19
(at least in comparison with industrial researchers), for the university administration as 
well. 
 
It is necessary, however, to emphasize the fact that in US universities tenure is normally 
granted for excellent research (rarely for teaching). This research is what appears in peer-
reviewed journals, and is the substance of the “publish or perish” promotion scheme. 
[Occasionally tenure will be granted because a junior faculty member has been 
particularly successful in obtaining research grants, but this success, too, normally starts 
with a high quality publication record] Thus, tenured faculty have a track record of doing 
what is recognized to be high quality research. Moreover, in spite of the independence 
conferred by tenure, there are other material and intangible rewards that continue to 
depend on a productive research career – salary, laboratory and office space, technical 
staff assistance, even prestigious endowed chairs. One thing that is hardly ever a factor in 
a US (much less European) university career is a history of inventing and patenting. 
 
Thus faculty members with commercializeable patents have tended to follow the path of 
Townes and Bloembergen, procuring patents (often with the aid of university staff) and 
licensing them for a royalty. Alternatively, the more entrepreneurial faculty may choose 
to obtain venture capital backing and start their own company, although this path is far 
more likely to be followed by graduate students such as the founders of Google than it is 
by tenured faculty. It is only in the last twenty years that the glow of licensing income has 
tended to dazzle the eyes of university administrators. 
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Now, the default option has become that “all intellectual property is the property of the 
university”, with rights to be granted to the inventor or creator limited by the Bayh-Dole 
Act and by contractual terms of employment as in the traditional model for industrial 
research staff. Rigorous application of this principle can create endless trouble, not least 
in the accounting department. A professorial lecture, for an honorarium with travel 
expenses, requires records and paper shuffling, tax consequences and other headaches. 
Few faculty are happy with this, in spite of defensible administration arguments that they 
provide offices, laboratories, equipment, and administrative support at no charge (with 
the frequent exception of an unconscionable overhead charge on external contracts!). 
 
Unfortunately, again with the pharma and bio exceptions, the amount of money to be 
retained by the university for intellectual property transfers almost never pays for the 
administrative overhead involved.  
 
The University Challenge 
 
The challenge for US university technology transfer management is to reconcile the 
university’s missions of teaching and contributing to society with the requirements of 
effective technology transfer. Professors expect to publish and get tenure, grants and 
fame. Students expect to publish and get their degrees, followed by good industrial jobs. 
The university, on the other hand, dreams of getting a financial return on its research – 
even though most of the research is funded by the US government or industry, and the 
returns on the IP have historically been minimal. At a minimum, this requires delay or 
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suppression of publication, possibly combined with a selection of projects which are 
likely to lead to licensable IP. 
 
The conflict is a major one. Indeed, even many industrial researchers are frustrated and 
troubled by the restrictions placed on their “academic freedom” by the iron laws of 
securing patent protection.  
 
The Transfer Agreement – A Necessity to Success 
 
As the Harvard – IBM episode graphically demonstrates, an industrial technology 
transfer partner has many options, and holds most of the bargaining power. An inflexible 
university negotiating position is risky. In spite of this, many universities – primarily the 
most prestigious – have been inclined to adopt a “take it or leave it” stance. This typically 
starts with insisting on being the owner of any patents resulting from the cooperation or 
grant. Of course, “ownership” is more a matter of prestige (and, occasionally, statute) 
than of substance, since an exclusive license generally satisfies most companies. 
However, for the same reason, it would seem advisable for a university to concede this 
point if pressed. Much of the rigidity on the part of university negotiators is very likely a 
result of their lack of familiarity with the industrial environment, a lack which needs to be 
addressed.  
 
On the other hand, it is often the inventors themselves that are out of touch. Since, thanks 
to the Bayh-Dole law, they have a monetary interest in any transfer, universities often 
give them a veto over any deals. We have found that – like most inventors – they often 
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have an inflated idea of the value of their inventions. Hence, they sometimes prevent 
consummation of a favorable deal by their ambitions. In contrast, their interest in a quick 
deal can lead university transfer personnel to close a deal prematurely, limiting the payoff 
– to the benefit of the transferee. 
 
More often, however, the interests of the faculty and of the university are on the surface 
completely opposed. Faculty members are intent on publishing. They will often avoid 
disclosing any inventions or, perhaps, minimize their importance when disclosing them. 
Even after disclosing an invention, they will lobby to prevent filing for a patent or, if that 
cannot be avoided, will press the attorney to quickly complete the case so they can 
publish. It is important to note that these attitudes are not unique to university researchers. 
Many industrial researchers have very similar attitudes, the only differences being that 
they often have little or no financial interest in any transfer while having much less 
independence as to how they accomplish their research work. The first “laser” patent was 
drafted and rushed to the Patent Office by the Bell Labs patent department over the 
Thanksgiving holiday so that Townes and Arthur Schawlow could submit their paper to 
the Physical Review21.  
 
Operationally, these circumstances require that university technology transfer 
professionals be familiar with the needs and abilities of industry; with the actual market 
prices for technology transfers; and with the skills needed to persuade researchers to 
accept the best deal they can negotiate. 
 
                                                 
21 Myers and Dixon, op. cit. 
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US Government Research Institutions 
 
The US government spends tens of billions of dollars on research and development, of 
which the $30+B funneled to university research is only a part. Internal institutions, such 
as the NIH, Defense, and Energy department laboratories receive the lion’s share. The 
requested total for the 2006 R&D budget is an astonishing $132.3B22. By statute, even 
the DoD laboratories are charged with carrying out a certain amount of so-called “dual-
use” research, which is to say research which, in addition to supporting the mission of the 
laboratory, can also be said to have benefits to society as a whole.23 Consistent with this, 
the strictures of the Bayh-Dole law apply as well to these government researchers.  
 
The task of identifying a project with dual-use aspects is not easy and, in practice, 
technology transfer from dedicated government labs to society, much less to industry for 
a payment, has not been a raging success, considering the huge investment. This is hardly 
surprising, if disappointing. It is a rare researcher who can – as it were – serve two 
masters, and it was a definite stretch for the Congress to so mandate. 
 
IBM Anecdotes  
Technology transfer within an enterprise is naturally not the same as transfer from a 
university to an enterprise. On the other hand, where the company has an internal 
“research” organization or function, many of the problems are quite similar. A brief look 
at these problems is, in fact, quite instructive and offers some important messages for 
                                                 
22 See  http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/pdf/spec.pdfreference page 64 
23 See William J. Barattino, Making Dual-Use Work: Revising Government/Industry Relationships, 
National Defense University Research Report, Executive Research Project S3, 1994, for a detailed 
discussion at http://www.ndu.edu/library/ic6/94-S-03.pdf 
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university technology transfer professionals. IBM in particular, with its $6B Research 
and Development budget (and 3000-person worldwide Research Division), is probably 
the best example. Sadly, Bell Telephone Laboratories, at one time the premier corporate 
research establishment in the world, has suffered greatly as its parent, AT&T, endured 
various divestitures and then (now in the form of Lucent) saw its business on a steep 
downward path.  
 
We have already seen how Thomas Watson Sr. had a high regard for research, university 
capabilities, and the importance of intellectual property. This eventually led to the 
establishment of a formal research organization, with an explicit mission of transferring 
its technology (as well as its people) to the product divisions of the company. This 
mission was more clearly articulated in the 1970’s by then-director Ralph Gomory, as to 
be “Vital to IBM” while contributing to the scientific community at large. In 
accomplishing these missions, the Division instituted a formal measurements program, 
where achieving a high score was directly reflected in the Division’s annual incentive 
pay.24  
 
A primary measurement was “Accomplishments”, in which both internal transfers and 
outside recognition were explicitly counted. Other aspects related to patent applications, 
refereed technical publications, external honors such as fellowships and awards, and a 
formal customer satisfaction survey of the targeted internal recipients of Research 
Division results. One of the most important needs in order to achieve the Division goals 
                                                 
24 R. A. Myers, Customer Satisfaction and Quality in the IBM Research Division. Proceedings of the 1994 
R&D Quality Symposium, the Juran Institute, Chicago, IL. June 7, 1994 
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was for its management and researchers to understand what was important to their 
customers. This is not as obvious as one might suppose, since many researchers (not to 
mention university professors!) often believe that they are the sole judges of what is 
important. Moreover, “knowing” is a continuing process, not an event. As IBM’s 
businesses evolved, and as its customers’ requirements developed, the Division’s 
program had to adapt, albeit in less than real time. Consistent with that imperative, in 
2005 the Research Division has initiated programs in what it calls “services science” to 
address the needs of its now dominant services business 25 . Similarly, to achieve 
recognition from the scientific community at large, it is important to have a deep 
knowledge of what is deemed to be important. Of course, for both internal and external 
knowledge, a high quality team of researchers is also expected to help define what is, or 
will be found to be, important. This kind of leadership is, ultimately, the most important 
test of success. 
 
Perhaps the biggest obstacle to internal transfers that IBM Research has experienced is 
the unavoidable fact that its customers are also its competitors. Although they do not 
carry out “basic” research, they have extensive staffs working to advance the technology 
underlying their products under development. Moreover, their researchers, too, are very 
good. The Microelectronics organization has more Ph.D.’s in its fields of expertise than 
does the Research Division, and many of them have been recognized for their 
contributions by academics and other industrial researchers around the world. At a 
Corporate level, too, there is competition for resources, money in particular, from the 
                                                 
25 See Paul Horn, Building a Science of Services, Business Week, June 2, 2005 at 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jun2005/tc2005062_0596.htm  
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parent company. A high degree of tact is essential, combined with the knowledge 
discussed above. 
 
While it is often possible to identify programs and projects which are important to the 
developers, the mechanics of a complex enterprise pose serious challenges. In addition to 
the “competitive” situation, in IBM as in most well-run corporations, budgets are usually 
fixed for at least the current year, and are often planned for years into the future. If a new 
project is to be injected into a product organization, the unit either has to find new money 
from the parent (rarely easy) or else to reallocate its internal people and money, at least 
cutting and possibly terminating on-going projects. Years of experience has taught that a 
well-timed “sales campaign” is needed in order to achieve a successful transfer. The 
prospective transfer recipient needs to be worked with throughout the year to establish 
and build his receptivity, but the magic time to make the “sale” is when budgets are being 
prepared. Once the budget is fixed, the transfer is in a “wait until next year” status. 
 
There are several approaches to smoothing a transfer, most of which also apply to 
university transfers. Perhaps the most successful was the creation of “joint projects”, 
partnerships between Research Division and product division teams – and budgets26.  
Since these programs are jointly planned and executed, the “transfer” is somewhat 
automatic, although a successful transfer naturally depends on the completion of the 
project’s goals. One difficulty with such projects is that, since their goals and plans are 
                                                 
26 See Ralph E. Gomory, Moving IBM’s Technology from Research to Development, Research - 
Technology Management, November-December, 1989, pp. 27-32, Turning Ideas Into Products, The Bridge, 
official journal of the National Academy of Engineering, Spring, 1988, and From the “Ladder of Science” 
to the Product Development Cycle, Harvard Business Review, November-December 1989, page 99. 
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primarily established at the start, they are less likely to be dedicated to highly innovative 
(i.e., risky) initiatives, and they would seem to work best where the project is complex, 
with multiple sub-projects that must proceed in parallel.  
 
Another important tactic adopted by the Research Division was to designate an 
experienced manager in most departments whose job was “customer relations and 
satisfaction”. His or her key assignment is to “know” the customer division’s plans, needs, 
and challenges, and to work with the Research team to see that their work addresses these. 
On an individual level, his or her personal advancement and pay depend to a major 
degree on how well the unit achieves its transfer targets. 
 
Also, in a combination of US and Japanese cultures, the Division – as mentioned above – 
has a formal measurements system to track its effectiveness. This measurement system is 
combined with an ambitious set of incentives, starting with relatively high financial 
“awards”, salary increases, and promotions which to a significant extent depend on 
successful technology transfers or on achieving high external technical and scientific 
recognition. Possibly most important, management is seen as accountable for success.   
 
IBM as a Technology Transfer “Customer” 
IBM routinely leads the world in the number of US patents granted annually. IBM 
income from licensing its intellectual property portfolio, at one time over $1.6B, is still 
more than a billion dollars a year. All of this is managed by a centralized corporate 
organization, and all patents are “owned” by the Corporation, rather than by any units, 
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although the units receive essentially all of the income earned by patents that they 
generated. With this great store of its own intellectual property, IBM needs very little – 
and thinks it needs even less. Therefore, any outsider hoping to make a sale of his 
intellectual property to IBM must complete an extremely challenging obstacle course. 
Few do. In practice, almost the only patents that IBM elects to license-in are patents 
which the company is very likely to infringe with planned products. Or is already 
infringing.  
 
On the other hand, IBM and its business units routinely support universities and 
university research. There are many reasons for this. Perhaps foremost is their 
contribution to public relations, wherein IBM will make grants for various purposes to 
institutions of higher education in the vicinity of its major plants and laboratories. Almost 
as important, and in tandem with this, are IBM’s recruiting objectives. In particular, 
supporting graduate students’ research (either directly or by means of fellowships) is a 
very efficient and cost-effective recruiting mechanism. Less often, the company will 
propose a partnership with a university in which a faculty member is an authority in a 
field of interest or importance to the company. Sometimes, too, the university may have a 
laboratory facility that IBM researchers would like to use, but which is too expensive to 
duplicate. 
 
Where university research is supported, IBM – recognizing the publishing imperative of 
faculty – rarely insists on confidentiality or exclusive patent rights. The company has 
generally been relatively easy to do this kind of business with, so long as the university 
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adopts a reasonable path. Of course, what is “reasonable” to IBM may not always be 
reasonable to the institution. As one example, IBM would not ordinarily fund research if, 
after completion, it would then have to pay a royalty for the right to use the results. In the 
language of the street, they will take their business elsewhere. As already noted, valuing a 
patent is a highly subjective process but experience has shown that one rarely errs in 
assuming that patent rights are not worth very much.  
 
Fairfield Resources International (FRI) Experience 
FRI is an intellectual property licensing and consulting group whose principals have 
almost 100 years of relevant experience as executives with major corporations, senior 
officers of the Licensing Executives Society, and as consultants to some of the largest 
corporations in the world, including Boeing, Siemens, Ricoh and many others. One 
recurring task assigned to us occurs when a major industrial corporation is building a 
defensive patent portfolio. Possible reasons for this include entering a new business or a 
change in the product mix when the company may face new competitors with existing 
patent positions. We take on the task of locating and procuring patents in the target field, 
taking advantage of our anonymity to minimize the risk that a seller will ask an 
unreasonable price. 
 
We ordinarily search – almost exclusively -- for US patents, assigned to universities and 
to industrial companies as well as to individuals. The universities are a very promising 
place to look, as they often have many patents which are not exploited. Of course, many 
are “sleeping” because no one would be interested in licensing or purchasing them. 
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However, others are not used because, in our experience, patent licensing and sale is a 
pro-active endeavor which is quite challenging for a university’s licensing staff. IBM is 
typical in not being very interested in obtaining rights to other’s patents (unless forced to 
do so); a patent owner must ordinarily mount a campaign, which can take several years, 
to interest a prospect in taking out rights to a patent. In contrast, university transfer or 
licensing offices have many other things to do – mainly, negotiating research contracts. 
They don’t ordinarily have the time and interest to invest a lot of time in a few patents. 
 
Their job is, in some ways, complicated by the Bayh-Dole law. Inventors who anticipate 
a big payday are impatient and, as pointed out in several places above, rarely appreciate 
the value of their patent to a third party. We have recently reached a tentative agreement 
with a major US university for the purchase of a few patents which would add to a 
client’s defensive portfolio. The institution gives the inventor a role in the negotiation, 
however, and he has implied that the price (agreed to by the licensing office) is not high 
enough. In another instance, we represented a university on licensing a forward-looking 
Internet patent which, however, was (and still is) of minimal use to anyone. After two 
years of marketing, we had only made small progress. Prodded by the impatient (if 
brilliant) inventor, the university reclaimed the licensing program, unfortunately with no 
more success than we had. 
 
Nevertheless, we believe that universities can recoup at least a modest portion of their 
patenting investment by being open to reasonable offers for sale of or an exclusive 
license to their otherwise sleeping patents. Here, as in most of the preceding discussion, 
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pharmaceutical and biomedical patents are a major exception. A major reason for this is 
that companies in this industry have found it profitable to literally outsource their 
research, so the resulting intellectual property is relatively valuable, sometimes 
immensely valuable. Since the companies pay for the research, they will not enter into a 
relationship unless they obtain exclusive rights in advance. Normally, however, a portion 
of resulting royalties – if any – would be returned to the university. 
 
It cannot be repeated too often that the major reason for obtaining a patent is in 
anticipation that another party will want to use it, and be willing to pay for that right. 
University research, by its very nature, is far from the marketplace. Considerable time 
and money are almost always needed in order to commercialize a university patent. 
Persuading a company to sign up for a license is difficult at best. If the university further 
insists on an up-front payment, it becomes difficult indeed other than for a sale, as 
outlined above. 
 
Choosing Transferable Research 
Clearly, outstanding researchers don’t need any help in this matter. Their choices in a real 
way are ordinarily, by definition, transferable. Unfortunately, such leaders are rare. 
Others can benefit from adopting some “best practices” from industrial transfer 
experience. The biggest challenge, we believe, is simply the normal inflexibility of plans 
and budgets in a complex organization. A direct approach to this is to be an active 
participant in setting the plans and budgets. That includes setting long term goals and 
strategies, as well as working with customer personnel in the annual planning cycle. 
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However, success in these processes demands that the researchers have credibility. They 
need to have good interpersonal relations with the customer, and they absolutely must 
understand, perhaps even better than the customer, his business and needs. 
 
There is no substitute for participating in the planning process. However, there is a 
complementary approach that can increase the size of the research payoff. Researchers, 
often frustrated by the difficulty in making headway against an entrenched product and 
technology base, choose instead to pursue “alternative technology solutions”. Graduate 
students, facing well-funded industrial competition in a hot field, are very familiar with 
this technique, and often are driven to it in order to prevent being “scooped”. Recently, 
the work of Clayton Christensen at Harvard has even given a name to these alternatives 
when successful, “disruptive technologies” 27 . One good example is the xerographic 
printer, which had to contend with the extraordinarily profitable impact printers in the 
1970’s.  
 
There have been many others. Some have not made it to the market, such as magnetic 
bubbles and Josephson junction logic. Others, like the plasma and liquid crystal (LCD) 
display, have been so successful that they have virtually eliminated the former CRT 
technology of choice from the marketplace.  What I recommend here, however, is not 
simply choosing to work on “something different”. The chances for success are small 
enough. It is necessary to understand the weaknesses of the entrenched technology, and 
the strengths of the proposed alternative, in order to make a good choice. One example is 
                                                 
27 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma, HarperCollins Publishers; 1st HarperBusiness ed 
edition (May, 2000) 
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optical storage, now ubiquitous in the Compact Disk (CD) and Digital Versatile Disk 
(DVD). When first proposed more than thirty years ago, the technology was thought to be 
a potential replacement for the conventional magnetic hard disk drive. When it finally 
broke into prominence, however, it was as a write-once medium, most useful because of 
its high areal storage density. Speed and erasability, still difficult challenges, were not 
key to this application. 
 
A third approach, perhaps the ideal one insofar as it is a combination of the first two, is to 
initiate projects which, if successful, will intersect the needs of the marketplace at a 
reasonably predictable future date without posing a threat to the current products and 
technologies. Here, too, as in any of these tactics, both knowledge and credibility are vital. 
Even so, as experienced industrial researchers will agree, success is not guaranteed, and a 
success rate of ten per cent in research started to research transferred is not too bad. 
 
Recommended Best Practices 
We can summarize the key messages from the foregoing as follows. 
• Organize to succeed – assign responsibilities for transfer, and be sure the 
responsible people are measured and held accountable for success. 
• In order to do this, effective measurements of success are needed. They can 
include 
– Royalty income – unfortunately a trailing measurement 
– “Customer satisfaction” surveys, in the university case as a means of 
ensuring that research partnerships are on track. 
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– Publications and awards 
– Citation indexes 
– Patent applications and issued patents 
• Promote excitement about commercialization in faculty and students, by 
techniques such as adjunct faculty from industry, internships, sabbaticals, and 
frequent seminars from the industrial world. 
• Provide financial and other incentives such as research facilities for researchers 
with successful transfer experiences 
• Develop experienced TLO staff, probably starting with staff who already have 
industrial transfer experience. 
• Develop relationships with potential industrial licensees and partners in order to 
assure that the researchers have suitable credibility. This can be greatly assisted if 
there is a “customer relation manager” who is responsible and accountable. 
– Understand their needs and situation 
– Select transferable research topics 
– Participate in planning as a regular habit 
• Don’t be greedy. Demanding too high a price is the surest way to preclude a 
successful transfer. 
• Be patient. Successful transfers take time, often a lot of it. They often also require 
that the recipient of the technology invest its own people and money. Impatience 
is another deal killer. 
• Persevere. Technology transfer is not easy. 
 
   35
Messages for Japanese TLO Management 
Some of the best practices outlined above require little if any change by Japanese TLO’s. 
In particular, the customer focus and quantitative measurements are both embedded in the 
psyche of Japanese management. However, it is easy to lose sight of the importance of 
these cultural traditions in the rush to get on the “IP Royalty Bandwagon”. That would be 
unfortunate, since there is nothing automatic about earning a return on one’s intellectual 
property, and these practices can provide Japanese university TLO’s with an important 
competitive advantage in this effort. 
 
On the other hand, there is a lot that could be done to improve incentives. Although there 
is a “Japanese Bayh-Dole” equivalent, it is a trailing indicator and even then only 
motivates a small number of the most successful inventors. What is needed is a way to 
fill the pipeline of patents flowing through the universities. Regular payments for various 
patenting milestones (such as disclosures, applications, and issued patents), even if small, 
can provide effective and timely feedback to the university research community. Other 
forms of recognition, such as recognition in institution publications, personal 
acknowledgment letters from the university president, and even such basic elements as 
bulletin board notices and inventor portraits in a central location have been found to be 
effective in US companies. It is essential that a culture of inventing and patenting be 
clearly and visibly endorsed by the administration.  
 
Nevertheless, it would be a serious error if the institution of such incentives were allowed 
to detract from the university’s fundamental educational and research missions. 
   36
 One long term and substantial challenge is to reconcile the lifetime employment and 
seniority systems as practiced in most universities with the need to generate good, 
commercializeable technology. Many large global Japanese enterprises are already 
moving toward a system of pay for performance, and promotions based on ability and 
actual contributions to the company. Universities have been slow to follow. “Publish or 
perish” is a tough regime, but it is far superior – at least with regard to technology 
transfer – to “promotion and salary increases with or without publication”. The current 
system often encourages highly motivated Japanese researchers to leave academia for 
Japanese industry or, to the nation’s greater loss, to leave the country for companies and 
universities abroad with a more favorable environment for researchers. 
 
Japan’s undisputed excellence in establishing processes to ensure the quality of their 
goods and services is readily applicable to providing for continuous improvement of 
university technology transfer. In this regard, there is nothing special about technology 
transfer. However, simply establishing and staffing a TLO can easily be seen as mere 
tatemae. As I suggest in the previous section, the mission and staff of the TLO need to be 
professional and competent, and recognized as such by the university and industrial 
research community, in order for them to achieve their objectives. 
 
Today, if measured by the number and quality of US patents, Japanese universities really 
do not have a substantial inventory of potentially transferable intellectual property. That 
almost certainly means that there will not be very much royalty income for some time to 
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come. That is unavoidable, and should not be viewed as a major problem. Royalties, in 
Japan as in the rest of the world, are not what make a great university. A great university 
need not ever make any money from technology transfer. Its most important missions are 
educating students and contributing to human knowledge. 
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